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1The Dynamics of Lifecycle Investing in 401(k) Plans 
Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary R. Mottola, Stephen P. Utkus and Takeshi Yamaguchi 
Over the past quarter century, US workers have been increasingly made responsible for 
the management of their own retirement portfolios.  In particular, employees in 401(k) plans 
today are expected to decide their investment allocations when they enroll in their plans and then 
proactively manage their accounts thereafter, given the employer-designed investment menu.  
But recent research has raised concerns about workers’ ability to handle pension plan 
investments, having detected substantial evidence of behavioral biases and inertia, naive 
portfolio diversification, excessive reliance on conservative investment options, and financial 
illiteracy regarding basic investment concepts.  These findings, in turn, stimulated an important 
shift in US retirement policy embodied in the 2006 Pension Protection Act (PPA).  Specifically, 
the PPA now permits firms to offer workers professionally-managed but “default” investment 
funds within 401(k) plans, rather than having workers be responsible for actively managing their 
retirement accounts.   
Among the options authorized for such default investment as so-called target-maturity 
date (TM) lifecycle funds.  In such funds, a worker must simply select the fund targeted to his 
expected retirement date (e.g. a 2030 fund).1   Thereafter, the fund manager takes over all 
responsibility for selecting asset holdings and rebalancing the portfolio over time.  Typical TM 
funds invest more in equities for younger employees, and as the target date nears, the TM fund’s 
equity holdings are gradually reduced toward a more conservative mix in what is known as the 
“equity glide path.”  TM funds, like other PPA-recommended default options, are notably riskier 
than the cash default investments previously observed in US 401(k) plans.  While a relatively 
2new type of investment option, TM funds have become extraordinarily popular very quickly, 
growing to $114 billion in assets (year-end 2006; ICI, 2007). 
The introduction of lifecycle funds into 401(k) plans offers a rich decision-making 
environment in which to assess the role of rational and behavioral elements in worker portfolio 
allocations, as well as to evaluate the impact of federal policy encouraging the use of riskier 
default portfolios.  To assess these questions, this paper provides an empirical assessment of how 
over a quarter million 401(k) participants responded to the introduction of TM funds in over 250 
plans over the 2003-2005 period, using a unique longitudinal dataset from Vanguard.
The 401(k) plans in our data set allow us to observe substantial heterogeneity in the types 
of decision-making environments influencing portfolio decisions.  In some cases, the TM new 
funds were simply added to existing menus, allowing us to observe workers’ active portfolio 
choices.  In other cases, the funds were designed as the plan’s default investment option for 
participants not making active investment choices.2  And in still other cases, participants were 
automatically switched or “mapped” into the TM funds from prior risk-based or static allocation 
(SA) lifecycle funds.   The result is a robust combination of employer-designated default options, 
plan menu changes, and active choice by workers.   
Three key findings emerge from our analysis.  First, consistent with behavioral models of 
portfolio choice, employers do shape adoption patterns of new 401(k) investment funds through 
mapping effects and default fund designations. Sponsor decisions influence not only the adoption 
rate, but also whether participants tend to be “pure” adopters who hold only lifecycle funds, or 
“mixed” adopters holding them in conjunction with other funds.  “Choice architecture” 
(Benartzi, Peleg and Thaler, 2007) does matter.  However, second, not all participants are as 
passive as suggested by behavioral models.  There are elements of rational choice by new plan 
3entrants, who encounter the TM options for the first time upon entering the plan.  And there are 
elements of constrained rational choice as TM funds are voluntarily selected by existing 
employees with low financial literacy characteristics.  Menu and default effects do not explain all 
portfolio allocation decisions.  Third, participants who adopt lifecycle funds have their retirement 
saving portfolios change in measurable ways, even though the TM funds do not add new asset 
classes to the plan menu. Thus adding TM funds reshapes the age distribution of equity 
exposure, eliminates extreme zero- or all-equity positions, and alters the portfolio share of 
idiosyncratic versus systematic risk in adopters’ portfolios.  These portfolio results are consistent 
with either behavioral or information cost-constrained models of decision-making.  
Our results imply that PPA-like regulation permitting plan sponsors to offer workers 
professionally-managed default investment funds will modify 401(k) investment patterns, but the 
rate of change will depend on how the funds are introduced.  Offering lifecycle funds on a 
voluntary basis will gradually change investment behavior, as new hires elect them and as less 
financially literate employees are drawn to this investment solution.  A more substantial impact 
will be obtained if lifecycle funds are designated as the plan default. And adoption rates will be 
still higher, and the rate of change in portfolios more dramatic, if the employer actively maps or 
shifts employees to the new default fund from other plan investments.    
In what follows, we first briefly review relevant literature on 401(k) investment decision-
making, and elicit several testable hypotheses from that literature.  Next we describe our dataset 
and summarize the methodological approach. Subsequently we discuss who adopts life cycle 
funds and what impact lifecycle adoption has on savers’ portfolio characteristics.   A final 
section concludes.
4Related Studies and Hypotheses
Why would participants adopt TM funds when they are introduced into 401(k) plan 
menus?  Previous studies on 401(k) portfolio choice suggest three models of adoption behavior, 
including a rational agents’ hypothesis, a behavioral or employer menu hypothesis, and a 
information-cost-constrained or financial illiteracy hypothesis.  In this section, we explore the 
implications of each of these hypotheses. 
There is some controversy in the theoretical and empirical literature about whether 
rational investors should adopt age-based portfolio allocation patterns.  Early theoretical models 
argued against changing equity portfolio allocations with investor age.  For instance, Samuelson 
(1969) and Merton (1969) point out that constant lifetime equity exposure is optimal, given 
standard risk aversion and iid asset returns.  By contrast, more recent work by Viceira (2001) and 
others indicate that equity allocations should optimally decline with age, if one allows for illiquid 
human capital and borrowing constraints.3  Empirical studies on actual equity allocations by age 
come to mixed conclusions.  Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) discern little age-based variation in 
equity exposure in a sample of relatively highly-paid educators. Meanwhile, Agnew, Balduzi and 
Sunden (2003) find that equity allocations decline by about one percent per year of age, in their 
study of a single corporate-sector 401(k) plan.
If participants were rational agents in the Samuelson or Merton sense, they would not be 
expected to adopt TM funds at all, given the funds’ age-based pattern of equity exposure.
Conceivably, participants might still use the funds as part of their portfolio if the funds included 
previously unavailable asset classes.  However, in our dataset, to be described in more detail 
below, the newly introduced TM funds only included asset classes previously offered to 
participants as individual 401(k) fund choices.  Thus, the remaining rational agents’ argument for 
5adopting TM funds is that investors do have a preference for age-based rebalancing, and that the 
type of rebalancing on offer matches their own preferences for such a feature.  For such 
investors, holding a TM fund would be expected to reduce portfolio transaction costs – in our 
case, the time and effort associated with ongoing rebalancing.  Thus, all other things equal, TM 
fund adopters would be more likely to be high-income participants, given the opportunity costs 
associated with their time and effort.4   A corollary is that rational agents adopting TM Funds 
would experience no change in portfolio risk and return characteristics, inasmuch as the specific 
appeal of the funds is due solely to the convenience of age-based rebalancing, and not to their 
unique underlying investments.   
A second hypothesis regarding lifecycle fund adoption, resulting from a behavioral 
economics perspective, posits that workers’ portfolio choices are driven by employer menu 
decisions. Prior studies have suggested that participants spread their money evenly among 401(k) 
plan fund offerings using a “1/n” heuristic (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001) or across a subset of 
funds using a “conditional 1/n” rule (Huberman and Jiang, 2006).  The fraction of the menu in 
specific types of assets, such as equities or high-cost active equity funds, also appears to shape 
participant asset allocations (Bernartzi and Thaler, 2001; Brown, Liang and Weisbenner, 2006). 5
More broadly, participant decisions are influenced by the “choice architecture” implicit in the 
design of a 401(k) plan (Benartzi, Peleg and Thaler, 2007).  A possible explanation for these 
menu-based effects is inertia, which has been noted in retirement planning generally 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999 and 2001), in 401(k) investment choice (Madrian and Shea, 
2001), and in ongoing rebalancing of portfolios (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004; Agnew, Balduzzi, 
and Sunden, 2003, and Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus, and Yamaguchi, 2006a and 2006b).  
6Participants appear to “go with the flow” and often fail to make active investment choices in 
401(k) plans.
These studies suggest a second hypothesis, namely that introducing lifecycle funds will 
reshape portfolios purely due to sponsor menu effects - in our case, when employers map 
workers into TM funds from prior SA funds, or when they designate TM funds as a plan default.
Evidence supportive of this hypothesis would include finding that mapping and default effects 
would influence not only lifecycle plan adoption, but also alter fundamental risk and/return 
characteristics of the portfolios. 
A third hypothesis regarding lifecycle fund adoption arises from the literature on 
financial illiteracy and participant decision-making, which suggests a model of rational choice 
subject to information costs.  401(k) participants readily admit they are inexperienced in making 
investment decisions (Fontaine, 2006; Vanguard, 2003), they are unfamiliar with common 
financial concepts (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007), and they regularly misunderstand investments, 
believing, for instance, that money market funds include stock investments or that employer 
stock is safer than a diversified equity portfolio (John Hancock, 2002).  More broadly, many 
lower-income and lower-wealth households fail to hold any equity at all although economic 
models predict they would be better off with at least a small equity position (Campbell 2006).6
Evidence in favor of this hypothesis would include the finding that TM adopters are most likely 
to be young, low wage, low wealth and female, where low levels of financial literacy are most 
concentrated.7
7Data Set and Descriptive Statistics
To assess whether the introduction of lifecycle funds alters investment patterns, we 
investigate a unique panel dataset covering 258 defined contribution plans drawn from 
Vanguard’s 401(k) recordkeeping system.   Our full sample includes over 252,000 active 
participants in plans that introduced TM funds during 2003-058; all participants entering and 
leaving the plans due to normal workforce turnover are included.  The dataset is thus far richer 
than other research studies which have relied on experimental findings, aggregate plan flows, 
small plan samples, or cross-sectional-only data.  Our full data set allows us to analyze adoption 
patterns when the TM funds are first introduced.  As well we utilize a subset of around 25,000 
TM adopters to assess the impact of TM funds on portfolio characteristics.  This TM adopter 
sample includes participants who elected at least one TM fund and whom we observe both one 
month prior to and six months after the fund is introduced.9
Variables available for empirical analysis include a wealth of detail on participant 401(k) 
account balances, investment holdings and account contributions10, as well as key socioeconomic 
characteristics including age, sex, household income, and non-retirement financial wealth.11
Also available are important features about each plan’s offered investment menu, including the 
number and types of investment funds offered and other plan design details. In addition our data 
set includes monthly returns for all investments offered in our plans over an eight-year period 
(including the three-year period under analysis as well as the five years preceding it).  
Table I summarizes sample characteristics.  Across the 258 plans, there is substantial 
diversity by age, income, 401(k) account balance, and non-retirement financial wealth.  TM 
adopters are younger, more female, and earn less than the full sample; they also have lower 
401(k) balances (Columns 1 and 2).  Nearly one in five participants in the full sample is a new 
8entrant to the plan.  Forty-four percent of those selecting TM funds are “pure” adopters, directing 
their entire contributions to TM funds; the remaining 56 percent are “mixed” adopters and 
contribute to TM funds along with other investment options (Columns 3 and 4).12  On a purely 
descriptive basis, before controlling on other factors, pure adopters are again younger and more 
female, compared to mixed adopters, and again they have lower 401(k) balances and non-
retirement financial wealth.  Conversely, mixed adopters tend to be older, more affluent males.   
Table I here
Panel A of Table II summarizes the attributes of the lifecycle funds introduced by 
employers in our dataset over the period under study. As indicated, each fund is named 
according to its target maturity date, and each involves different mixes of passively-managed US 
equity, international equity (both developed and emerging markets), and US high-quality bond 
funds.  Total equity exposure in the funds is 89% for younger participants in the 2035 and 2035 
Funds, versus 29% for older participants in the Income Fund (intended for those in their 60s 
nearing or in retirement). The underlying investments offered through the TM funds did not 
represent new asset classes or investment styles offered by the plans in our sample.13
Table II here 
In our sample TM funds were introduced into 401(k) plans in different ways.  For some 
plans, TM funds were the first type of lifecycle fund ever offered to participants.  As indicated in 
Panel B of Table II, almost half (45%) of the full sample was introduced to TM funds de novo,
while only 14% of the TM adopters were in this class. A large number of plans also previously 
offered static allocation (SA) or risk-based lifecycle funds, and sponsors varied in how they 
subsequently added TM funds.  Some portion of our sample was offered TM funds on top of pre-
existing SA funds (39% for the full sample; 51% for adopters), while the rest were switched or 
9“mapped” by their employer from SA to TM funds (16% v. 35%).14   In the case of mapping 
from SA to TM funds, sponsors could either switch all participant SA balances and contributions 
into the new TM funds, or allow existing balances to remain undisturbed, while switching future 
contributions into TM funds.  In either case, the new TM allocations would reflect the sponsor’s 
decision to move the money rather than representing an active employee election.  Finally, in 
some cases the employer designated the new TM funds as the plan default.  The default option 
would influence those participants, principally new hires, who were either automatically 
enrolled, or who enrolled on a voluntary basis but refused to make an active investment choice.   
Portfolio Characteristics 
Table III describes the investment characteristics of TM adopters’ portfolios “before” and 
“after” the TM funds were added to the menu—specifically, one month prior to adoption (time t-
1) and six months later (time t+6).   Panel A summaries the allocation of participant 
contributions by major asset class, including cash (money market or guaranteed investment 
contracts), bonds, balanced or lifecycle funds, US equities, employer stock, and international 
equities.  The most notable feature is that many TM adopters contributed to balanced or SA 
lifecycle funds before the new menus were introduced; these funds accounted for 79% of pure 
adopters’ and 35% of mixed adopters’ contributions.  This statistic again points to the 
importance of controlling on the prior presence of the pre-existing menu design in order to 
evaluate the impact of TM funds on participant behavior.
Table III here
Panel B of Table III reports mean values for three portfolio attributes measured for TM 
adopters, again on a before and after basis.  The first attribute we examine is the percent of the 
10
portfolio held in equity.15  Before the change, our mean TM adopter held two-thirds of his 
contributions going to equities; six months later, equity allocations rose by 1.4% for all adopters 
before controlling on other factors. Pure adopters devoted somewhat less and mixed somewhat 
more to equity before the change.  With the advent of TM funds, pure adopters changed their 
equity allocations slightly less (1.0% versus 1.8%), again before controlling on other factors.
The second portfolio attribute reported in Panel B of Table III shows how the 
participants’ portfolios changed in terms of the overall systematic or risk-adjusted return. 
Systematic returns refer to the sum of the risk-free rate during the period, fr , and each 
participant’s factor return, or etir , . Factor returns are computed using a three-factor model based 
on US equities, US bonds and international equities because, as noted earlier, the TM funds in 
our dataset are composed of index-based funds mirroring these three asset classes. To calculate 
portfolio returns, we first construct a risk-loading matrix for all k investment options in our 
dataset. Specifically, we regress the excess return (over Treasury bill returns) for each of the k
assets in our universe on three market indices: the value-weighted CRSP portfolio, the Lehman 
Brothers Aggregate Bond Index (LBA), and the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
Europe, Australia and Far East (EAFE) Index.16  The systematic return for each 401(k) 
investment option is simply its factor exposure times the average factor returns over the period; 
the participant’s factor return is simply the weighted average return of his or her factor exposures 
over the period.17   The risk-free rate is added to the participant’s factor return (and annualized) 
to arrive at the returns shown in column 2 of Panel B (Table III).   
Two features stand out about the return calculations.  One is that the returns rise across 
the board, for all adopters as well as for pure and mixed adopters, before controlling for other 
factors, particularly time effects.  Second, the difference in returns between pure and mixed 
11
adopters is small.  For example, on a “before” basis, mixed adopters held 15% more equity than 
pure adopters’ (70.7% is 15% higher than 61.4%), but their returns were only 2% higher (6.52% 
is 2% higher than 6.38%).  This suggests that those who later became pure TM investors had, 
probably through SA and balanced fund holdings, successfully constructed more efficient 
portfolios with lower equity exposure but similar expected returns.18
The third portfolio attribute reported in Table III is the ratio of idiosyncratic portfolio risk 
as a fraction of total portfolio variance, ./ ,tiTVNSR
19  This measure describes how much of 
portfolio variance is explained by nonsystematic or non-market factors.  By definition, 
nonsystematic risk should be zero when all of a participant’s contributions are directed to index-
based TM funds.  Not surprisingly, this measure of risk falls in Table III for all lifecycle plan 
adopters: it is eliminated for pure TM adopters, and it falls for mixed adopters. 
Who Adopts TM Funds? A Multivariate Analysis 
 To explore the “treatment effect” associated with TM fund introduction, we estimate the 
probability of lifecycle adoption, LCAdopteri,j,t which refers to the probability that the ith
participant holds a TM fund in the jth plan in month t. The multivariate model is as follows: 
tjijtitji TREATMENT?PLANTPARTICIPANLCAdopter ,,,, ?????? ???????      (1)
where the dependent variable tjiLCAdopter ,,  takes a value of 1 if the participant invests in a TM 
fund in month t, and 0 otherwise. The mean value of this variable is 15.1%.20
The model includes controls on key socioeconomic characteristics including age, income, 
sex, and non-retirement financial wealth. The PARTICIPANT vector also includes a new plan 
entrant identifier, New Entrant, equal to 1 if the participant entered the plan after the TM funds 
were offered (0 otherwise).21  To control on cross-plan differences, the PLAN vector includes the 
12
number of fund choices available in each plan, a dummy indicating company stock is available in 
the 401(k) plan, and an indicator of loan availability.  The TREATMENT vector captures several 
factors associated with the particular way in which TM funds were introduced.  The Time Count 
variable (and that same variable squared) indicates how many months had elapsed since the TM 
funds were introduced. For reasons noted above, we also control on SA_Before which indicates 
whether static allocation funds had been previously offered; and a Default indicator indicates 
whether the new TM funds had been designated as the default investment option. The 
econometric models also correct for plan-level heteroskedasticity ( i? ), time fixed effects ( t? ),
and industry fixed effects, along with missing data controls. 
 Table IV provides estimates of a multivariate Probit model comparing TM adopters with 
other participants, to determine what factors are linked to life cycle fund adoption.  We first 
observe that sponsor-driven menu changes profoundly influence participation adoption, 
consistent with a behaviorally-motivated employer menu hypothesis.  The largest marginal 
effects are associated with the prior availability of SA funds in the plan menu; the presence of 
such funds, whether through mapping by the sponsor or awareness of such funds by participants, 
raises TM adoption by more than double (16.9% versus the dependent variable mean of 15%).  
When an employer designates TM funds as the default investment, this boosts the likelihood that 
participants will adopt TM by 11.4%, or three-quarters the pre-TM mean.  We term this the 
“PPA effect,” indicative of how much participation in TM funds may increase as a result of 
sponsor decisions to select a TM default fund under the Pension Protection Act.  The time since 
the menu was enhanced is also a related factor as indicated by Time Count, the number of 
months since the funds were introduced.  Participation rises by 2% after 10 months of having the 
TM funds on offer.
13
Table IV here
While sponsor decisions are important, there is also strong evidence of participants 
making active portfolio choices.  One group displaying active decision-making are new plan 
entrants, who are 7.1% more likely to adopt TM funds after controlling for sponsor-driven menu 
and default effects.  New entrants appear closest to rational agents making independent portfolio 
choices upon encountering the 401(k) menu for the first time.  Our finding on new entrants is 
consistent with other studies that have reported that new plan entrants tend to change portfolio 
behavior more in light of current financial market conditions or adopt new 401(k) plan features 
(Vanguard, 2003 and 2006).   Table IV also demonstrates that TM funds are more likely to be 
adopted by participants with characteristics typically associated with low levels of financial 
literacy.  These include young, lower paid, and female participants, as well as those with low 
401(k) balances and low levels of non-financial retirement wealth. These findings are supportive 
of our financial literacy hypothesis, of rational agents constrained by information costs.  TM 
funds, by their very simple design, eliminate such information constraints and replace all 
portfolio choices with the selection of a single expected retirement year.   Our findings are also 
inconsistent with our rational agents’ hypothesis, which suggested that higher-income 
participants would select these funds due to the opportunity costs associated with rebalancing.
Interestingly, offering more funds in the 401(k) menu slightly reduces participation in TM funds.
The effect is small (having 10 additional funds means a 2% lower chance of holding TM funds) 
but it does offer some modest support for the finding from the prior literature that participant 
holdings are influenced the fraction of the plan investment menu represented by a given fund 
option.
14
Next we separately analyze the differences between pure versus mixed lifecycle adopters. 
Table V reports results from a multinomial Logit model where tjiLCAdopter ,, is equal to 1 if the 
participant is a mixed adopter; 2 if he is a pure adopter; and 0 if he is a nonadopter (the reference 
group). Empirical results are reported as marginal effects. As before, there are potent effects of 
sponsor menu and default fund selections, and again new entrants are particularly likely to be 
TM adopters.  The differences in estimated coefficient magnitudes between the two types of 
investors are also revealing.  If SA funds were previously offered, this is more likely to result in 
mixed adoption than in pure adoption (5.1% v. 3.7%). One possible explanation is that 
participants were more likely to adopt SA funds rather than TM funds on a mixed basis.  We also 
see, unsurprisingly, that defaulting workers into TM funds is more likely to lead to pure rather 
than mixed adoption.  
Table V here 
There are also interesting demographic differences between pure and mixed adopters.  
Pure adopters are more likely to be new plan entrants, and also more likely to be female, 
younger, lower income, and have lower 401(k) and non-retirement wealth, than participants who 
do not adopt TM funds.  This pattern seems consistent with the conclusion that this group is most 
in need of professional financial advice, perhaps because of low financial literacy. Mixed 
adopters are also likely to be younger and female, but they tend to be middle income and middle-
wealth participants, compared with non-adopters.  The mixed adopters results are therefore 
subject to conflicting explanations.  On the one hand, mixed adopters may be engaged in naïve 
diversification by allocating only a portion of their portfolio to a “portfolio in one fund” solution.
On the other hand, mixed adopters are more affluent, and so are more likely to be more 
financially literate.  Mixed adoption could be evidence of a more sophisticated approach to 
15
investing. 22   To determine how TM funds fit into mixed investors’ portfolios, more research is 
required into actual investment intentions.  
In sum the evidence reveals two influences in 401(k) plan investment patterns.  Clearly 
employer-driven menu and default patterns help shape participant choice of lifecycle funds, 
confirming the behavioral hypothesis.  We find little support for the pure rational agent 
hypothesis that affluent participants facing large opportunity costs from rebalancing will be most 
likely to adopt lifecycle funds.  Yet there is also a substantial group of participants actively 
selecting the new funds, mainly new entrants and participants who appear to be less financially 
literate.  Finally, while pure adopters seem to be perceive lifecycle funds as suitable for their 
needs, mixed adopters appear to have more complex motivations.  
Portfolio Effects of Adding Lifecycle Funds
Next we turn on an assessment of how lifecycle fund adopters’ portfolios change when 
lifecycle funds are introduced into their portfolios. Using a difference-in-difference approach, 
each participant is observed one month before and six months after adopting the TM fund.  Three 
dependent variables are of particular interest, namely the participant’s percentage allocation to 
equities, his portfolio’s systematic returns, and his share of nonsystematic risk as a percent of 
total portfolio variance (NSR/TV). Each of these dependent variables, summarized in a vector 
we term PORTFOLIOi,j,t , taking the following form:   
TREATMENT?PLANTPARTICIPANPORTFOLIO tji ?? ???,,
.,, tjijti ???? ????               (2)
Model A includes just these terms; Model B adds interaction terms (INTERACTION) to test 
whether specific groups display differential treatment patterns when lifecycle funds are 
introduced.  For example, LC_Treat*Young allows us to examine the differential impact of TM 
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treatment on participants under age 35.  For this difference-in-difference approach we must 
exclude the DEFAULT and NEW ENTRANT treatment variables: all participants are observed 
both before and after the lifecycle treatment effect, so we cannot observe either true default 
effects or the entry of new hires into the plan. 
Table VI summarizes estimates for the equity allocation models, differentiating results 
for pure and mixed adopters.  The variable LC_Treat in Model A captures the simple change in 
equity allocation after controlling for differences in participant and plan features, timing and 
industry fixed effects, and plan-level heteroskedasticity.  In Model A, all else constant, pure 
adopters devote less to equity (1.8 percent) but no change is seen for mixed adopters.  Model B 
adds treatment interactions for participant and plan characteristics, the most important of which 
is with respect to age.  Now it is clear that for pure and mixed adopters, younger workers invest 
more in equity after TM funds are introduced (LC_Treat + LC_Treat*Young), while middle-
aged and older people reduce their equity share.  Figure 1 summarizes the age effects; the old-
young difference increases by 8-10 percentage points.  It is worth noting that the changes in 
equity shares by age remains meaningful for mixed adopters, who on average direct one-third of 
their portfolio contributions to TM funds.
Table VI and Figure 1 here 
Not only does the overall allocation to equity change when TM funds are introduced, but 
the distribution also becomes less dispersed as shown in Figure 2 for both plans offering TM 
funds de novo (top panel) and those offering SA funds previously (bottom panel).
(Corresponding statistics measuring the dispersion of equity allocations are presented in Table 
A1 in the Appendix.)  When TM funds are offered de novo, participants had previously clumped 
their equity holdings at two focal points, namely 0 and 100%, with another group holding a mid-
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range of equities (61-65%, a typical allocation in many balanced funds). After the new funds are 
offered, adopters’ portfolios now concentrate around the five key target percentages embodied in 
the main TM fund offerings.  (Of the six funds offered, two had near-identical asset allocations.) 
In fact, the cross-sectional standard deviation of equity allocations among pure adopters falls by 
half, from 34 to 16 percent, after TM funds are offered. For mixed adopters, here too, the zero 
and all-equity allocations are mostly eliminated, though the changes are attenuated.  Overall, the 
standard deviation of equity allocation distributions for adopters falls by one-quarter.23
Figure 2 here 
Next we analyze expected returns and risk characteristics before and after TM funds are 
offered. Table VII reports results for Models A and B, similar to those in Table VI.  The first two 
columns show that pure adopters can expect returns to rise by 19-21 basis points per year when 
they shift to an all-TM portfolio.  Also interesting are the changes by age, with young pure 
adopters seeing expected returns rise by an annualized 13 basis points (.0019-.0013). By 
contrast, older pure adopters can expect lower returns by 25 basis points (.0019-.0011) per year, 
partly due to their having more cash at older ages.24  For mixed adopters, depicted in the next 
two columns of Table VII, changes in returns are not statistically significant. 
Table VII here 
The second half of Table VII indicates how portfolios nonsystematic risk share (NSR) 
changes when TM funds are introduced. Not surprisingly, it virtually disappears for pure 
adopters, who move all of their contributions to an all-index life cycle fund.  Specifically for 
pure adopters, nonsystematic risk is 6 percent of total variance before TM fund adoption; the 
marginal effect of shifting to TM funds is a negative 5.1 percent.  The NSR share falls less for 
younger participants (-2.9%) than for older participants (-5.2%).  Changes for mixed adopters are 
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more notable: after investing in TM funds, their NSR risk share declines by over 40% (a 
marginal effect of -8.3% on a mean of 19.9%). Accordingly, even affluent mixed adopters who 
use TM funds for only part of their portfolios can experience a meaningful reduction in 
nonsystematic risk exposure.  
These results, we believe, are inconsistent with the pure rational agent model of TM fund 
adoption, and strengthen the behavioral and information-cost or literacy hypotheses.  Introducing 
lifecycle funds in our sample does not expand the range of capital market assets that plan 
participants could elect.  Yet they result in marked changes to portfolio and return characteristics.  
That is, equity allocations change materially by age as a result of sponsor menu changes, for both 
pure and mixed TM adopters.  Pure adopters see systematic returns rise; both pure and mixed 
adopters see a large decline in the portfolio share of idiosyncratic risk. These findings suggest 
that these funds help those laboring under financial illiteracy constraints, perhaps by eliciting or 
making more obvious the notion of age-based equity variation.  They also confirm behavioral 
menu-driven effects where introducing new lifecycle funds triggers changes in the risk and 
return characteristics of participants’ portfolios.   
Discussion and Conclusions  
In recent years, sponsors have expanded their use of lifecycle funds within 401(k) plans 
in an effort to improve 401(k) portfolio outcomes.  At the same time, federal retirement policy, 
through the 2006 Pension Protection Act, is likely to encourage greater reliance on risky default 
investments for participants, including TM lifecycle funds.  TM-type funds have been proposed 
for the Federal Thrift Savings Plan for federal government employees, some state defined 
contribution schemes, and even a defined contribution model under the US Social Security 
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system.  Other countries including Chile already offer target maturity-type funds in their national 
defined contribution systems.   
The introduction of such funds into 401(k) plans allows us to assess worker portfolio 
allocations in a rich decision-making environment, including sponsor-initiated default choices, 
menu changes, and active choice by workers.  This paper demonstrates that while behavioral 
models of decision-making do dominate explanations of 401(k) portfolio allocations, there are 
also elements of rational and information cost-constrained choice.  First, sponsor-initiated menu 
changes have a powerful effect on investor behavior, particularly when the TM funds are 
designated as the default, or when the sponsor chooses to map participants from other options to 
the TM funds.  These sponsor decisions not only influence adoption rates, but they also influence 
whether participants hold lifecycle funds as pure adopters or combine them with other funds in a 
mixed strategy.  These results are consistent with a behavioral hypothesis regarding the effect of 
menu design and employer decisions on participant portfolios. Second, at the same time, many 
plan participants do make active choices about their pension investments, so menu and default 
effects are an incomplete explanation for 401(k) allocation choices.  Specifically, new entrants to 
401(k) plans making active choices are more likely to adopt TM funds. In addition, a particular 
subset of existing workers – younger, less affluent, and female participants – appear to elect 
lifecycle funds because of their essential simplicity, consistent with a model of choice 
constrained by information costs.   
Third, among existing participants switching to lifecycle funds from other portfolios, 
lifecycle fund adoption does materially change portfolio characteristics.  Specifically, it narrows 
the distribution of equity exposure, eliminating 100% and zero-equity portfolios, while 
enhancing the age distribution of equity exposure.  Further, it reduces participants’ portfolio 
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idiosyncratic risk.  These results further strengthen the diagnosis of both behavioral and 
information-cost or literacy-constrained models among TM fund adopters.  The results 
undermine the narrowly rational agent argument for adoption based on the notion of convenient 
age-based rebalancing, and the opportunity costs incurred by high-wage workers in engaging in 
such portfolio activity.  
Ultimately, our results suggest that strategies for improving portfolio allocations, such as 
default fund rules proposed under the Pension Protection Act, will vary in efficacy and speed 
depending on the path taken.  How quickly 401(k) participant investment patterns over time will 
depend on how the funds are introduced, and also the composition of each firm’s workforce.  
Providing TM funds on a voluntary basis alone changes plan investment behavior only gradually, 
via new plan entrants (where the rate of change will depend on workforce turnover), and via low-
literacy participants drawn voluntarily to this new investment solution.  If an employer 
designates lifecycle funds as a default, it will further raise adoption.  And if the employer shifts 
or maps participants from their existing portfolios to something like an age-based lifecycle fund, 
this will result in the largest and most rapid change in portfolio characteristics.25
Ultimately, our findings underscore the fact that even with sponsor-driven menu effects 
and default decisions, active decision-making by workers remains important as well.  While the 
US 401(k) system is gradually shifting toward greater reliance on default investment choices, it 
remains the case that many millions of existing participants make investment choices on their 
own.  In the end, it will be their behavior over time, not solely sponsor choices, that will 
determine how quickly 401(k) portfolio allocations change in response to the introduction of a 
novel investment feature like lifecycle funds.
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Table I.  Characteristics of the Full Sample Offered Target Maturity [TM] Funds and the 
Subsample of TM Adopters 
Full 
Sample 
(Offered
TM)
Adopter 
Sample 
(Adopted
TM)
Pure TM 
Adopters
Mixed TM 
Adopters
1 2 3 4
Sample size
Number of plans 258          251          228          234
Number of participant accounts 252,980   24,612     10,750     13,862
Age
Young (< 35) 25.4% 27.8% 32.7% 24.1%
Middle (35 to 55) 59.0% 59.2% 55.1% 62.5%
Old (> 55) 15.6% 12.9% 12.3% 13.5%
Sex
Male 45.3% 41.3% 31.3% 49.1%
Female 26.1% 30.3% 32.6% 28.5%
Missing 28.7% 28.4% 36.1% 22.5%
Income
Low (< $62.5K) 19.4% 22.8% 25.3% 20.9%
Medium ($62.5-$87.5K) 39.1% 39.4% 44.2% 35.7%
High (> $87.5K) 41.5% 37.7% 30.4% 43.4%
Job tenure
% new entrants 18.3% na na na
401(k) balance (mean) 64,065$ 50,032$    34,289     62,240
Non-retirement financial wealth
Poor (< $7.3K) 42.3% 41.3% 44.2% 39.1%
Average ($7.3-$61K) 34.9% 36.7% 35.6% 37.6%
Rich (> $61K) 22.8% 21.9% 20.2% 23.3%
Plan design features (% of participants)
Company stock offered 30.8% 26.4% na na
Loan offered 66.9% 61.9% na na
No. of funds offered (mean) 34.2 33.0 na na
  Subset of TM Adopters
Note: Participant characteristics measured at 12/05 for full sample and six months after TM introduction for Adopter 
sample. 
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Table II.  Lifecycle Funds Overview
A.  Lifecycle Funds Offered* 
% US 
equities
% inter- 
national 
equities
%
domestic 
bonds  TOTAL 
% total 
equities
2045 Fund 71% 18% 11% 100% 89%
2035 Fund 71% 18% 11% 100% 89%
2025 Fund 63% 16% 21% 100% 79%
2015 Fund 50% 13% 37% 100% 63%
2005 Fund 35% 9% 56% 100% 44%
Income Fund 24% 5% 71% 100% 29%
*As of 9/07
B. Lifecycle Funds Treatments 
            PLANS   Participants   TM adopters
No.  % No.  %  No.   % 
1.  Introduction of TM de novo 117       45% 113,560    45% 3,541        14%
2.  Addition of TM to SA 83         32% 99,201      39% 12,509      51%
3.  Switch from SA to TM 58        22% 40,219     16% 8,562       35%
Total TM offered 258       100% 252,980    100% 24,612      100%
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Table III.  Contribution Allocations and Portfolio Risk/Return Characteristics Before and 
After the Introduction of TM Funds: All Adopters, Pure TM Adopters, and Mixed TM 
Adopters
A.  Contribution Allocations
Cash 
(MM, 
GIC) Bond
Balanced 
& Life 
Cycle US Equity
Company
Stock
Inter-
national 
Equity
All TM Adopters Before 7.1% 5.2% 54.2% 27.9% 2.7% 2.9%
After 3.7% 3.6% 66.1% 21.7% 2.3% 2.7%
Change -3.4% -1.7% 11.9% -6.2% -0.4% -0.3%
Pure TM Before 4.9% 2.9% 79.4% 11.3% 0.5% 0.9%
Adopters After 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Change -4.9% -2.9% 20.6% -11.3% -0.5% -0.9%
Mixed TM Before 8.7% 7.0% 34.7% 40.8% 4.3% 4.5%
Adopters After 6.5% 6.3% 39.8% 38.6% 4.0% 4.8%
Change -2.2% -0.7% 5.1% -2.2% -0.3% 0.2%
B.  Portfolio Risk/Return Characteristics
Equity 
Allo-
cations
Syste-
matic 
Returns NSR/TV*
All TM Adopters Before 66.6% 6.46% 13.8%
After 68.1% 6.70% 10.0%
Change 1.4% 0.24% -3.8%
Pure TM Before 61.4% 6.38% 6.0%
Adopters After 62.4% 6.63% 0.9%
Change 1.0% 0.25% -5.0%
Mixed TM Before 70.7% 6.52% 19.9%
Adopters After 72.5% 6.76% 17.1%
Change 1.8% 0.24% -2.8%
Note: * NSR/TV refers to portfolio nonsystematic risk as a percent of total variance; see text. 
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Table IV.  Multivariate Probit Analysis of the Probability of Being a TM Adopter 
(Dependent variable = 1 if TM Adopter, 0 Else) 
Mean Coefficient
Marginal 
Effect
Socioeconomic Factors
Young 23% 0.120 *** 2.3%
Old 16% -0.102 *** -2.0%
Male 45% -0.066 *** -1.3%
Low_Income 20% -0.029 *** -0.6%
High_Income 40% -0.004 -0.1%
Poor_Wealth 38% 0.035 *** 0.7%
Rich_Wealth 26% -0.092 *** -1.8%
Log Balance 9.8$ -0.063 *** -1.2%
New Entrant 11% 0.368 *** 7.1%
Plan Design
Company Stock Offered 26% 0.101 *** 1.9%
Loan Offered 59% -0.030 -0.6%
Number of funds 38.9 -0.011 *** -0.2%
Lifecycle Treatment
SA_Before 61% 0.878 *** 16.9%
Default 11% 0.592 *** 11.4%
Time Count 9.3 0.011 *** 0.2%
Time Count Squared 120.7 0.000 *** 0.0%
Participant Clustering Yes
Time Fixed Effect Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 3,178,373
Number of Clusters 252,980
-2LogL 2,300,773
Pseudo-R Squared 11.60%
Notes: ** Significant at the .05 level; *** Significant at the .01 level. Reference category for income is middle; for 
wealth is medium; for sex is female (missing also controlled). Mean of dependent variable 15.1 percent.  
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Table V.  Marginal Effects from Multivariate Logit Model of the Probability of Being a 
Pure or Mixed TM Adopter (Reference Group: Non adopter) 
Pure Adopter Mixed Adopter
Dependent variable mean 8.58% 7.69%
Mean
Marginal 
Effect Marginal Effect
Socioeconomic Characteristics
Young 24% 0.9% *** 0.5% ***
Old 16% -0.5% *** -0.7% ***
Male 43% -0.8% *** -0.2% ***
Low_Income 20% 0.2% ** -0.3% ***
High_Income 39% -0.2% 0.0%
Poor_Wealth 38% 0.5% *** 0.0%
Rich_Wealth 25% -0.8% *** -0.4% ***
Log Balance 9.8$     -0.7% *** 0.0% **
New Entrant 11% 2.4% *** 1.3% ***
Plan Design
Company Stock Offered 31% -1.6% *** 1.2% ***
Loan Offered 61% -1.2% *** 0.4% ***
Number of funds 37.6 -0.1% *** 0.0% ***
Lifecycle Treatment
SA_Before 57% 3.7% *** 5.1% ***
Default 10% 5.4% *** 1.5% ***
Time Count 8.6       0.4% *** -0.1% ***
Time Count Squared 120.7   0.0% *** 0.0% ***
Participant Clustering Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effext Yes Yes
Observations 3,178,373 3,178,373
Number of Cluster 252,980 252,980
-2LogL 3,354,106 3,354,106
Psuedo-R Squared 15.10% 15.10%
Note: See Table 3.  
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Table VI.  Marginal Effects from Multivariate Model of TM Treatment Effects on Portfolio 
Equity Allocation: Pure and Mixed TM Adopters 
Pure Adopters Mixed Adopters
Dependent variable means Model A Model B Model A Model B
Before treatment 61.4% 70.7%
After treatment 62.4% 72.5%
Unadjusted difference 1.0% 1.8%
Socioeconomic Factors
Young 0.006 *** 0.022 *** 0.052 *** 0.031 ***
Old -0.105 *** -0.085 *** -0.078 *** -0.060 ***
Male 0.010 ** 0.019 *** 0.019 *** 0.023 ***
Low_Income 0.004 0.004 -0.015 *** -0.017 ***
High_Income 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.007
Poor_Wealth 0.007 -0.005 -0.012 *** -0.016 ***
Rich_Wealth 0.010 ** 0.013 ** 0.005 0.001
Log Balance 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 0.016 *** 0.016 ***
Plan Design
CS_Offer -0.006 -0.004 0.022 *** 0.022 ***
Loan_Offer 0.074 *** 0.074 *** 0.011 0.011
Nfund 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.000 0.000
SA_Before -0.061 *** -0.062 *** 0.005 0.004
Treatment
LC_treat -0.018 *** -0.032 *** -0.006 -0.013 **
Interactions
LC_treat*Young 0.064 *** 0.043 ***
LC_treat*Old -0.040 *** -0.035 ***
LC_treat*Low_Income 0.000 0.004
LC_treat*High_Income -0.004 0.000
LC_treat*Male -0.016 *** -0.008 ***
LC_treat*Poor_Wealth 0.019 *** 0.007
LC_treat*Rich_Wealth -0.008 0.008
Clustering at Participant-level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effext Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21,500 21,500 27,724 27,724
# of Participants 10,750 10,750 13,862 13,862
R Squared 19.3% 20.2% 5.7% 6.0%
Note: See Table 3
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Figure 1.  Change in Equity Proportion After TM Fund Introduction: Patterns by Age 
3% 3%
-3%
-1%
-7%
-5%
10%
8%
-13%
-8%
-3%
2%
7%
12%
Young (< 35) Middle age (35-55) Older (> 55) |Old - Young|
Note: Authors’ tabulations, see text. 
33
Fi
gu
re
 2
.  
E
qu
ity
 A
llo
ca
tio
ns
 o
f T
M
 A
do
pt
er
s:
 B
ef
or
e 
an
d 
A
ft
er
 A
do
pt
io
n 
 
   
Pu
re
 T
M
 a
do
pt
er
s 
--
 N
o 
SA
 B
ef
or
e
  M
ix
ed
 T
M
 a
do
pt
er
s 
--
 N
o 
SA
 B
ef
or
e
   
Pu
re
 T
M
 a
do
pt
er
s 
--
 S
A
 B
ef
or
e
  M
ix
ed
 T
M
 a
do
pt
er
s 
--
 S
A
 B
ef
or
e
0%10
%
20
%
30
%
40
% a
) 0
.0
b)
1-5
c)
6-1
0 d) 
11
-15 e
)1
6-2
0 f) 
21
-25 g
)2
6-3
0 h)
31
-35
i) 3
6-4
0 j)
41
-45 k
)4
6-5
0 l) 
51
-55 m
) 5
6-6
0 n)
60
-65 o
)6
6-7
0 p)
71
-75 q
)7
6-8
0 r) 
81
-85 s
)8
6-9
0 t)
91
-95 u
) 9
6-9
9 v) 
10
0.0
Eq
ui
ty
 E
xp
os
ur
e
% Participants
B
E
FO
R
E
A
FT
E
R
0%10
%
20
%
30
%
40
% a
)0
.0
b)
1-5
c) 
6-1
0 d)
 11
-15
e)
16
-20
f) 2
1-2
5 g)
26
-30
h)
31
-35
i) 3
6-4
0 j)
41
-45
k)
46
-50
l)5
1-5
5 m)
 56
-60
n)
60
-65
o)
66
-70
p)
71
-75
q) 
76
-80
r) 
81
-85
s)
86
-90
t) 9
1-9
5 u)
96
-99
v)
10
0.0
Eq
ui
ty
 E
xp
os
ur
e
% Participants
B
E
FO
R
E
A
FT
E
R
0%10
%
20
%
30
%
40
% a
) 0
.0
b) 
1-5
c) 
6-1
0 d)
11
-15 e
) 1
6-2
0 f)
21
-25 g
) 2
6-3
0 h) 
31
-35
i) 3
6-4
0 j)
41
-45 k
) 4
6-5
0 l) 
51
-55 m
) 5
6-6
0 n) 
60
-65 o
) 6
6-7
0 p) 
71
-75 q
) 7
6-8
0 r) 
81
-85 s
) 8
6-9
0 t) 
91
-95 u
)9
6-9
9 v)
10
0.0
Eq
ui
ty
 E
xp
os
ur
e
% Participants
B
E
FO
R
E
A
FT
E
R
0%10
%
20
%
30
%
40
% a
) 0
.0
b)
1-5
c)
6-1
0 d)
 11
-15
e) 
16
-20
f) 2
1-2
5 g)
 26
-30
h)
31
-35
i) 3
6-4
0 j)
 41
-45
k) 
46
-50
l) 5
1-5
5 m)
 56
-60
n) 
60
-65
o)
66
-70
p)
71
-75
q)
76
-80
r) 
81
-85
s)
86
-90
t) 9
1-9
5 u)
 96
-99
v)
10
0.0
Eq
ui
ty
 E
xp
os
ur
e
% Participants
B
E
FO
R
E
A
FT
E
R
N
ot
e:
 A
ut
ho
rs
’ t
ab
ul
at
io
ns
, s
ee
 te
xt
 
34
A
pp
en
di
x 
T
ab
le
 A
1.
  C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
na
l V
ar
ia
tio
n 
in
 E
qu
ity
 E
xp
os
ur
e 
M
ea
n
St
. D
ev
.
M
ea
n
St
. D
ev
.
M
ea
n
St
. D
ev
.
1.
  T
M
 a
do
pt
er
s /
 n
o 
SA
 b
ef
or
e
   
  B
ef
or
e
64
.2
%
0.
34
71
.8
%
0.
28
68
.0
%
0.
31
   
  A
fte
r
62
.8
%
0.
16
72
.6
%
0.
19
67
.7
%
0.
18
   
  %
 C
ha
ng
e
-2
%
-5
3%
1%
-3
2%
-1
%
-4
2%
2.
  T
M
 a
do
pt
er
s /
 S
A
 b
ef
or
e
   
  B
ef
or
e
60
.9
%
0.
22
70
.6
%
0.
23
66
.4
%
0.
23
   
  A
fte
r
62
.4
%
0.
19
72
.5
%
0.
21
68
.2
%
0.
21
   
  %
 C
ha
ng
e
2%
-1
4%
3%
-9
%
3%
-9
%
3.
  A
ll 
TM
 a
do
pt
er
s
   
  B
ef
or
e
61
.4
%
0.
24
70
.7
%
0.
24
66
.6
%
0.
24
   
  A
fte
r
62
.4
%
0.
18
72
.5
%
0.
2
68
.1
%
0.
2
   
  %
 C
ha
ng
e
2%
-2
5%
3%
-1
7%
2%
-1
7%
   
 P
ur
e 
ad
op
te
rs
   
M
ix
ed
 a
do
pt
er
s
   
  A
ll 
ad
op
te
rs
35
Endnotes
1 In this paper we reserve the term “lifecycle fund” for the TM concept. The lifecycle concept is 
sometimes broadened to include risk-based static allocation (SA) funds, such as conservative, 
moderate or aggressive funds. SA funds are increasingly referred to as “lifestyle” funds.
2 Participant accounts may be invested in a default fund in three ways.  First, in a plan with voluntary 
choice, participants may elect to contribute to the plan, but fail to make an investment election, and so 
will be invested in the default option.  Second, the sponsor may require participants to make a separate 
investment election for non-matching employer contributions, such as a profit-sharing contribution, to 
the plan; participants who fail to make an election are invested in the default option.  Third, the 
participant may be automatically enrolled in the plan and invested in the default fund.
3 Viceira (2007) also notes that the “age-based” approach to investing is most appropriate for workers 
whose labor earnings volatility is low and relatively uncorrelated with equity. Recent work by Bodie 
and Treussard (2007) and Horneff et al. (2007) recommends a “hump-shaped” pattern of equity 
exposure by age due to changes in human capital over the lifetime.   
4 Within the 401(k) plans in our study, participants incur no brokerage commission or other market-
related transaction costs (as well as no taxes) when switching among funds, and so transaction costs 
are related solely to time and effort.  
5 401(k) menus may also influence participant choices through “choice overload,” such that 
participants offered too many choices either fail to participate or opt for more familiar (i.e., 
conservative) investments (Iyengar, Huberman and Jiang, 2004; Iyengar and Jiang, 2006). 
6 Adopting too-conservative portfolios can be costly, reducing expected real returns by as much as 350 
basis points per year for younger and less affluent participants (Mottola and Utkus, 2007).
36
7 A direct test of the role of financial literacy would require actual data on both adopters and 
nonadopters financial abilities; lacking this, we can indirectly associate literacy with demographic 
characteristics found in other studies to proxy for financial knowledge and experience.
8 Active 401(k) participants are those who are currently contributing to their employer’s retirement 
plan.
9 Because we observe participants six months after TM funds are offered, both the full sample and 
subset of adopters include only plans which introduced TM funds by June 2005.  The TM adopter 
subset has 7 fewer plans because these had no TM adopters as of December 2005. Of the 252,000 
participants in the full dataset, 189,968 were included in their plan both one month before and six 
months after the TM funds were introduced.
10 We focus our portfolio analysis on 401(k) contributions rather than fund balances because 
contributions are more reflective of forward-looking intentions and unbiased by prior holdings.
11 Household income is imputed based on zip codes as is non-retirement financial wealth, and is 
provided by the IXI Company.
12Over 95% of pure adopters contribute to only one TM fund; mixed adopters contribute to 4.5 funds 
on average.  
13 Prior to the introduction of TM funds, all of the sample plans offered broad-based US equity index 
and high-quality US bond index funds; only seven plans did not offer at least one international equity 
index fund. Tang (forthcoming) shows that all but a handful of the plans in the broad universe from 
which our plans were drawn were “efficient’ in that they spanned eight broad global capital market 
indexes. The less efficient ones were only modestly so, and did not differ from the others markedly in 
their plan offerings.  
37
14 Overall, 86% of the TM adopters were in plans where the employer switched from SA to TM funds. 
15 Equity allocation is equal to the percentage of contributions directed to US equity funds, 
international equity funds, company stock, and a percentage of balance/lifecycle funds.  The equity 
percentage for balanced/lifecycle funds was calculated based on each fund’s investment policies and 
varies from fund to fund. 
16 This regression function can be written as tk
e
tEAFE
e
tLBA
e
tCRSP
e
tk rrrr ,,3,2,1, ???? ???? , where 
e
tkr , is the 
excess return of fund k in month t (i.e., the nominal fund return less the risk-free rate in that month), 
and e tCRSPr ,
e
tLBAr , and
e
tEAFEr , are the excess monthly returns CRSP, LBA and EAFE indices. ???????and
???are the regression coefficients or factor loadings; ?k,t is the error term.  The regression is estimated 
over the 96-month period—five years prior to our sample period and the three years covering our 
sample.  )'ˆ,...,ˆ(ˆ 1 kbb?? , where kbˆ  is the estimated loading vector of fund k, which can be written as 
)'ˆ,ˆ,ˆ(ˆ 321
kkk
kb ???? .
17 The mean returns of our three factors (CRPS, LBA and EAFE) over the 96-month period are given 
by: ),,( ,,, tMSCIRFtLBARFtCRSPRFf rrrr ? .  The systematic return associated with the kth asset is its factor 
exposure times the average factor returns over the 96 months, namely: fk
e
k rbr
'? .  The ith participant’s
excess return reported in Panel B of Table 3 is ?
?
?
N
k
e
ktk
e
i rr
1
,? , where tki ,,?  is the weight of the kth fund 
in the ith participant’s contributions made in month t.
38
18 Virtually all of the SA funds in our sample included broad exposure to US and international equities, 
as well as US bonds.  Many of the balanced funds did as well, although some were exclusively US-
focused.
19 .ˆ/ˆ/ , i
idio
itiTVNSR ???   We estimate the variance-covariance matrix for all assets ?ˆ , which in turn is 
used to estimate the total portfolio variance for the ith participant, i?ˆ . Df ˆˆˆˆˆ
' ?????? , where Dˆ is a 
diagonal matrix with elements computed as the square of the k?ˆ estimated in equation (2).  The asset 
variance can be decomposed into systematic risk, ????? ˆˆˆˆ ' f
sys  and idiosyncratic risk idioDˆ .  Individual 
portfolio variance can be decomposed into its systematic and idiosyncratic component:  
idio
i
sys
itki
idiosys
tkitkitkii D ?????????? ˆˆ)ˆˆ(ˆˆ ,,
'
,,,,
'
,, ???? .
20 The mean value of lifecycle adoption is not 10% (in Table 1, 24,612 TM adopters divided by 
252,980 participants) because our measure is weighted according to the months in which TM funds 
were offered.  For example, if TM funds were offered in a given plan during 18 months of our analysis 
period, and a participant in that plan contributed to those funds over nine months, his adoption rate 
would be 50%. 
21 Not all new entrants are new hires.  Many of the plans in our sample allow immediate eligibility for 
the plan to new hires though a minority imposes a six- or twelve-month waiting period.   
22 For example, mixed adopters may only want to have a portion of their portfolio to be automatically 
rebalanced, or they may be engaging in a “core/satellite” strategy of having the lifecycle fund as a core 
holding, supplemented by satellite funds.  
23 Similar results ensue in the case where SA funds had been offered previously, although the results 
are not surprisingly smaller. 
39
24 Pure TM investors generally liquidate cash investments and shift their fixed income to bonds. Cash 
investments have zero excess returns by definition, while over our study period, bonds earned excess 
returns of 23 basis points per month. Our younger pure adopters moved from a cash exposure of 3% to 
0% when moving to TM funds, while older participants moved from 9% to 0%.  For mixed adopters, 
younger participants reduced equity holdings slightly, from 8% to 6%, while older participants moved 
from 11% to 9%.  
25 Sponsors forfeit so-called optional 404(c) fiduciary protection when undertaking such mapping, 
though it remains an appropriate strategy if the plan fiduciary judges such a move to be in the best 
interests of plan participants. 
